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Health Systems Science (Susan Skochelak, ed.; 2d edition, Elsevier 2019) 
 
Chapter: “Health Law and Ethics” 
William M. Sage, I. Glenn Cohen, and Allison K. Hoffman 
 
Learning Objectives            
1. Explain the relationship between law and ethics in the design and operation of U.S. health 
care. 
 
2. List several areas of health system governance that depend heavily on law, and identify 
the principal health laws in each area. 
 
3. Describe a few ways in which the transition from a dyadic approach to care based on one 
patient and one doctor to a systems approach based on teams, organizations, and 
populations presents challenges for health law and ethics.  
 
Chapter Contents Blurb 
 
Law and ethics are both essential attributes of a high-functioning health care system and 
powerful explainers of why the existing system is so difficult to improve. U.S. health law is not 
seamless; rather, it derives from multiple sources and is based on various theories that may be in 
tension with one another. There are state laws and federal laws, laws setting standards and laws 
providing funding, laws reinforcing professional prerogatives, laws furthering social goals, and 
laws promoting market competition. Complying with law is important, but health professionals 
also should understand that the legal and ethical constraints under which health systems operate 
must themselves adapt if health systems science is to advance.  
 
Chapter Outline 
 
I. Introduction: Law and Ethics in Health Systems Change 
A. From Rationing to Justice 
B. Big Ethical Questions and Enforceable Legal Obligations 
C. Ethics of Organizations and Groups 
 
II. Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest 
A. Self-Dealing in Ethics and Law 
B. Ambiguities in Understanding Conflict of Interest 
C. Payment Reforms and Non-Financial Motivators 
D. Institutional Conflicts of Interest 
 
III. Professional Self-regulation and Market Competition 
A. The Federal Antitrust Laws 
B. Physician-Hospital Relations 
C. Health Care Consolidation 
D. The Competitive Effects of Regulation and Self-Regulation 
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IV. Fraud and Abuse 
A. False Claims, Kickbacks, and Self-Referral 
B. Structural Causes of Fraud and Abuse 
C. Seeking Cultural as Well as Structural Change 
 
V. Privacy and Confidentiality 
A. The Duty to Protect Information Under HIPAA 
B. Other Medical Privacy and Mandatory Reporting Laws 
C. Privacy and System-Based Practice 
 
VI. Health Insurance 
A. Insurance Coverage in the United States 
B. Accepting Patients with Different Insurance Coverage 
C. Insurance Benefits and Cost-Sharing 
D. Provider Network Regulations 
E. The Cost of Complexity 
 
VII. Informed Consent to Treatment 
A. The Ethical Consensus on Consent 
B. The Weaknesses of Consent in the Law 
C. Consent Involving Systems of Care 
 
VIII. Medical Malpractice and Redressing Error 
A. The Unusual Salience of Medical Malpractice 
B. Malpractice Litigation 
C. Situating the “Malpractice System” in System-Based Care 
D. Communicating and Resolving Patient Harm 
 
IX. Withholding and Withdrawing Care 
A. Legal Distinctions Based on Competency 
B. Revisiting End-Of-Life Practices in Health Care Systems 
 
X. Summary 
 
XI. Review questions, answers and explanations 
 
XII. Annotated Bibliography 
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I. Introduction: Law and Ethics in Health Systems Change 
 
A systems approach to health care is replete with legal issues. State laws govern the provision of 
health care (such as licensing health professionals and facilities) and many aspects of health 
insurance. Federal laws determine how hundreds of billions of dollars flow through the health 
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care system each year (especially Medicare and Medicaid), and both fund biomedical innovation 
(the National Institutes of Health, among others) and regulate it (the Food and Drug 
Administration). Underlying both sets of laws is a strong commitment to professional self-
regulation, which continues to entrust physicians with authority over many aspects of medical 
practice even as corporate control grows and expenditures rise. The pursuit of value-based health 
care may be impeded by existing laws, or by fear of legal liability under conditions of 
uncertainty. Moreover, interest groups opposed to value-improving reforms may lobby to 
preserve or even increase legal barriers.  
 
The relationship between health law and medical ethics remains unsettled, although the rapid 
growth of the regulatory state has undoubtedly pushed law to the forefront.1,2  Still, ethics is 
intertwined with many features of the health care system, sometimes anticipating legal change, 
sometimes reacting to it, and sometimes filling gaps that remain in statutes, regulations, or 
judicial (courtroom) decisions. The ethics of personhood is a crucial aspect of health system 
governance, as is the related ethics of technologic change. The ethics of privacy has become 
particularly important as more information – including genetic information – is collected, 
exchanged, and analyzed electronically.  
 
A. From Rationing to Justice 
 
Fortunately, the ethical challenge most often associated with efforts to reduce health care 
expenditures – explicit or bedside rationing of life-saving services – is less of a concern in the 
current era of value-based health care design than in the decades that preceded it. Rationing 
seemed inescapable when society believed that nearly all care physicians recommended or 
rendered was scientifically required, precisely delivered, and fairly priced. Under those 
assumptions, spending more on health care meant spending less on other needs, and spending 
less on health care meant sacrificing quality or compromising access.3,4  
 
By contrast, the pursuit of value today is motivated by the recognition that health care delivery is 
grossly inefficient.5  Wasteful spending reduces quality rather than enhancing it, which implies 
that the pursuit of value can boost the health care system’s accessibility and therefore its fairness 
without requiring tragic choices. That is why the three prongs of the Triple Aim are framed as 
iterative, decentralized improvements rather than as competing characteristics of a system in 
ethically perilous equipoise.6 
 
At the same time, other ethical challenges have intensified. Many aspects of the health care 
system increasingly appear unjust, such as substantial barriers to receiving necessary services 
and demonstrable racial and ethnic disparities in both access and outcomes.7,8 Moreover, 
profound inequalities at the community level in wealth and education, endemic violence, 
concentrated environmental hazards, and other “social determinants” exert negative effects on 
health that cannot be overcome by medical care alone.9 
 
B. Big Ethical Questions and Enforceable Legal Obligations 
 
Other core issues in ethics and associated law respond to new medical technologies and changing 
social values. By the 1980s, the nascent field of bioethics had crystallized around a few topics: 
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reproductive technologies (such as in vitro fertilization) and the regulation of reproduction 
(abortion, contraception, sterilization, maternal-fetal conflicts); end-of-life decision-making, 
assisted suicide, and the definition of death; organ transplantation (procurement and allocation); 
and research ethics. In the late 1990s, genetics and genetic information became a central concern, 
along with HIV/AIDS and pandemic disease/bioterrorism. Behavioral health, drug development 
and pricing, population health, and global health also present persistent ethical-legal challenges. 
 
When one teaches pure bioethics, deeply normative arguments are always on the table. Questions 
might include: What criteria help us determine when legal personhood should begin or when 
individuals are dead? How should we understand coercion or exploitation in deciding whether 
organs or women’s eggs should be sellable? What claims can we make to health as a human 
right, and what do we owe one another as social solidarity? 
 
Translating bioethics into law, by contrast, requires a kind of double vision. With very few 
exceptions, normative and conceptual arguments must be introduced through formal procedures 
and translated into enforceable obligations with associated remedies. In the Baby K case, for 
example, the morally charged question of whether it is futile to periodically administer life-
saving treatment to an anencephalic infant with no possibility of higher brain function was 
“decided” by a federal appeals court based only on the words of a statute (EMTALA) that had 
been passed to assure that poor patients were not turned away from hospital emergency rooms.10 
 
Even if bioethics seldom convinces courts, it has very likely inspired legislatures to pass statutes 
and administrative agencies to adopt regulations, as well as motivating various groups to support 
or challenge those enactments. There may also be an upside of legal analysis: the dry vernacular 
of the courts sometimes “takes the political charge out of contentious issues and deflects 
expressive contention away from [them].”11  This, of course, raises an even harder “meta-
question” about whether the American civic ideal of the rule of law can withstand too much 
engagement with comprehensive moral views. 
 
C. Ethics of Organizations and Groups 
 
The development of systems of care has challenged both medical ethics and health law. 
Historically, medical ethics focused on individual duties and rights arising from the intimate, 
dyadic relationship between a single physician and his or her patient. As Paul Starr documented 
in his Pulitzer prize-winning book, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, legal 
doctrines arose that reinforced these ethical obligations by insulating the physician-patient 
relationship from both governmental and corporate control.12 A crucial task for health systems 
science, therefore, is to identify and rethink the ethical and legal inter-dependencies among 
health care professionals, health care institutions, patients, and the public. 
 
The rapid expansion of HMO-based coverage in the early 1990s (“managed care”) precipitated a 
vigorous debate over two ethical issues: whether individual physicians might ethically consider 
group as well as individual patient interests, and whether health systems might articulate and 
embrace a nascent “organizational ethics.” These controversial changes, which would be 
reinforced by law, reflect several underlying assumptions. First, that established “fiduciary” 
duties (see section below) would need to be supplemented by more complex corporate 
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obligations, including those associated with physician employment. Second, that protecting 
public funds from corporate exploitation could no longer rely on certifications of necessity from 
individual health professionals but would need to be done more directly. Third, that substantial 
self-regulation would need to occur through firm-specific processes with government oversight 
of corporate compliance, rather than exclusively through licensed professions. And, fourth, that 
corporate entities should be subjected to stronger expectations of market competition than has 
been the case for individual professionals, raising the question of whether “professionalism” can 
be maintained without allowing some degree of economic protectionism (“market power”).  
 
In the last two decades, the ethics of groups has expanded dramatically beyond HMO coverage 
to communities and populations more generally. In contrast to many European countries, which 
have a “public law” that imposes collective, constitutional obligations (“positive rights”) based 
on ideals of social solidarity, Anglo-American political philosophy has emphasized individual 
freedom from government coercion or restriction (“negative rights”). As a result, there is neither 
an enforceable right to health care in the United States nor a collective national commitment to 
providing it affordably. Both bioethics and health law are therefore entering unfamiliar territory 
as they confront a variety of population-based challenges: the optimal balance of individual and 
societal responsibility for health, emergency humanitarian interventions, health and human rights 
more broadly, setting priorities for health and health care investment, relating health to economic 
development, safeguarding vulnerable populations, environmental justice, population genetics, 
balancing health and civil liberties, global health equity, and social determinants of population 
health. 
 
Exercise 
Think of the law related to some aspect of medical care. Does the law answer all the 
questions of professional ethics or bioethics that occur to you in connection with that aspect 
of medical care?  Why do you think some bioethical questions have many associated laws 
and regulations, while others don’t?  When you need to make an ethical decision, do you 
expect to look up an answer, to ask a supervisor, to consult a colleague (if so, of what sort), 
to confide in family or friends, or to rely on your personal experiences and moral 
judgment?  Write a paragraph about an ethical challenge you personally faced or 
witnessed during medical or health professions school, describing how it was resolved (or 
not) and whether or not its resolution depended (or should have depended) on law. 
 
II. Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest 
 
Case Study 1:  You are a noted physician-researcher who is a salaried full professor at an 
internationally known non-profit academic cancer center. You run a large research laboratory 
there that studies the biology of cancer. You do not care for patients directly; rather, your 
laboratory conducts research trials that make promising therapies available to physicians and 
their patients at the cancer center and elsewhere. Over the course of your career, you have 
pioneered new treatments for several deadly cancers. Some of these treatments were patented 
and licensed to a large pharmaceutical company, which has developed FDA-approved drugs and 
biologics that pay you substantial royalties. You also have a lucrative consulting contract with 
the pharmaceutical company. Are these payments “conflicts of interest”?  Should you continue 
to accept them?  Should you disclose them to the cancer center?  To the federal government 
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under the ACA’s “Sunshine Act” provisions?  You also learned recently that the senior 
leadership of the cancer center and several members of its board of trustees have sizeable 
investments in a start-up company that has signed a contract with the cancer center to digitize its 
patient records and imaging results in connection with applying “big data” analytics to cancer 
care. Are these arrangements legally and ethically permissible?    
 
The power long granted the US medical profession to self-regulate, rather than being subject to 
governmental or corporate control, has carried with it a strong presumption of ethical conduct. 
Whereas a physician’s competence and skill in a particular case might be questioned later in 
court (e.g., in a malpractice suit), that physician’s commitment to act for the patient’s benefit has 
seldom been subject to direct legal oversight. This stands in contrast to the legal framework for 
policing the fiduciary obligations to shareholders of corporate directors and executives: bad 
outcomes (alleged violations of the fiduciary duty of care) are generally excused under the 
“business judgment rule,” but acts of self-dealing or prioritizing the interests of third parties 
(alleged violations of the fiduciary duty of loyalty) are closely scrutinized.  
 
In recent years, much greater attention has been paid to physicians’ ethical obligations beyond 
clinical competence, with areas of potential compromise often labeled “conflicts of interest.”13  
Conflict of interest has entered the health policy vernacular because of a growing recognition 
that each physician-patient relationship is subject to institutional complexities and financial 
entanglements, both of which are intensified by the uncertain yet lucrative process of biomedical 
innovation. These pressures call into question three layers of public trust in medicine and 
increase the perceived need for legal regulation: trust in physicians to serve their patients, trust in 
researchers to serve the interests of society, and trust in professions to ensure ethical conduct by 
their members.  
 
One can expect issues of loyalty and faithfulness to become even more important as care 
responsibilities are shared between individual professionals and health care organizations, as 
health care converges with health-related activities of private industry and public social service 
agencies, and as more data flows among (and is analyzed by) all of these actors, including using 
“deep learning” to anticipate and modify human behavior.  Both law and ethics will need to 
evolve as well, going beyond the direct disclosure that has been the traditional response to 
conflict of interest and meeting public expectations by developing transparent processes and 
rules of conduct.  
  
A. Self-Dealing in Ethics and Law 
 
Payments to physicians by pharmaceutical companies are the clearest example of conduct that 
can distort care, skew research, and reveal weaknesses in professional self-governance.14,15  
Constructing a health care system around costly services certified as necessary through 
individual physicians’ orders, referrals, or prescriptions creates a constant risk of kickbacks or 
the equivalent. The pharmaceutical industry dedicates fewer resources to research and 
development than to marketing, and for many years spent the largest sums on face-to-face “drug 
detailing” by sales representatives who routinely offered gifts – ranging from trivial to lavish – to 
physicians likely to prescribe their products. During this period, the professional ethical response 
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to the tension between physicians’ self-interest and their fiduciary obligations to patients was 
muted.  
 
Early ethical rules either merely echoed the legal prohibitions that were being adopted by 
Medicare to discourage unnecessary referrals (see the section in this chapter on fraud and abuse), 
or drew strained distinctions between prohibited gratuities and permitted payments for services 
rendered such as speaking or consulting – even though the latter may sway physicians to 
overprescribe company products. It took a series of scandals, as well as generational change 
among physician leaders, to overcome this ethical complacency. In 2010, Congress passed the 
Physician Payments Sunshine Act as part of the ACA, requiring all medical product 
manufacturers to disclose payments made to physicians or teaching hospitals to CMS, which 
makes that information publicly available through a searchable online database.16 
 
B. Ambiguities in Understanding Conflict of Interest 
 
Important questions remain unsettled regarding the legal and ethical response to physicians’ 
conflicts of interest. One question is whether the “primary interests” that take priority over 
“secondary interests” should be defined in terms of generally desirable attributes and broad 
social goals (e.g., professional altruism, scientific progress, the health of society) as opposed to 
specific obligations to identifiable parties (e.g., clinical decisions made to benefit patients).17  A 
treating physician has a specific obligation of loyalty to a patient; a biomedical researcher does 
not have such an obligation (and may inadvertently mislead a research participant by suggesting 
that such loyalty exists, which is known as the “therapeutic misconception”).18  Perhaps because 
individual physicians have only rarely faced situations where one patient’s interests directly 
conflict with another’s, such as those of a seriously injured potential organ donor and a transplant 
recipient, medicine has been less focused on specific obligations than, say, the legal profession – 
which is scrupulous regarding whether and how to represent clients who are competitors or 
adversaries.  
 
Labeling general motives and conduct as “conflicted” in the absence of specific duties can 
become a vehicle for professions to resist change and perpetuate bias, much as the medical 
profession for many years declared unethical any physician who accepted corporate employment 
(see the antitrust section in this chapter). It can also breed “tunnel vision” regarding available 
ethical or legal responses. Specific conflicts of interest between agents or fiduciaries (physicians, 
attorneys, etc.) and the principal parties usually present a policy choice between requiring direct 
disclosure and informed consent, which enables a patient or client to assess the professional’s 
likely fidelity given the conflict, and outright prohibition, which is justified when no amount of 
information given to the principal party would be sufficient to assure loyalty. Larger social goals, 
by contrast, are likely to be better served by regulatory approaches to misconduct that take 
account of the broader causes and consequences of new organizational forms and financial 
arrangements, as well as by corresponding changes to health professions education that seek to 
reset professional norms.  
 
C. Payment Reforms and Non-Financial Motivators 
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A second unresolved question concerns overall incentive structures for medical professionals. 
Ethical and legal agonizing over how physicians are paid if not on a fee-for-service basis 
demonstrates the limitations of the conflict-of-interest frame.19  Throughout the 1990s, attempts 
by managed care organizations to modify financial incentives associated with patient care to 
health plan enrollees (e.g., capitation, withheld fees, bonus pools) were met with accusations of 
conflict and demands for disclosure or prohibition.20,21  This faded as physician practice 
structures became too diverse and payments too intricate to bless or prohibit based on whether 
physicians were being paid to “do more” or “do less,” but was never replaced by a cohesive 
public policy regarding medical pricing and payment within health care organizations.  
 
Similarly, university-based physicians have been criticized not only for receiving external 
payments from industry but also for failing to confront their “non-financial conflicts of interest” 
– such as winning government research grants, achieving institutional advancement, or gaining 
professional eminence.22  This is particularly challenging when those considerations are alleged 
to compromise character. Human motivation is complex, and attempting to distinguish selfless 
from selfish conduct in the absence of a specific obligation and an identifiable external threat to 
fulfilling it is likely to prove fruitless.  
 
By contrast, pay arrangements for lawyers are not considered conflicts of interest but are 
separately governed by rules requiring written fee agreements with appropriate disclaimers while 
making available ethical review for reasonableness after a legal matter has concluded. The fact 
that a third party such as an insurance company is paying for a lawyer’s services does not 
substitute loyalty to that party for loyalty to the client. Lawyers’ internal motivations are not 
assessed under the profession’s rules of conduct unless they might compromise direct client 
service (e.g., family relationships, strong personal or religious beliefs). 
 
D. Institutional Conflicts of Interest 
 
A third unresolved question involves conflicts of interest at the institutional level, particularly 
within academic health care organizations that pursue mixed missions of patient care and 
biomedical research.  Case Study 1 is based on conduct revealed in 2018 that both prompted 
institutional soul-searching and created potential legal liability at a renowned cancer center.23 
The ethical challenges of shifting professional services into corporate entities is not limited to 
medicine: defining the ethical obligations of law firms as opposed to individual lawyers is also a 
work in progress. 
    
Many health care organizations require routine internal disclosure of conflicts by individual 
faculty and staff, which is reviewed and if necessary addressed by the organization. One real-
world trend that is making this process more tractable is to emphasize each employee’s 
obligation to the organization rather than to general professional ideals such as scientific 
progress, and to monitor and address conflicts of interest within health systems on that basis.  
While common in the corporate world, this approach departs from the traditional treatment of 
academic departments and individual faculty members as autonomous professional actors. 
Nonetheless, it has become a practical necessity to assure compliance with each organization’s 
various legal responsibilities (see confidentiality section in this chapter).  
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When considering “institutional” conflicts, many health care organizations focus mainly on the 
personal conflicts of individuals in leadership positions whose outside interests could influence 
the direction of the overall organization. What remains to be thoroughly examined are the 
obligations of large health care organizations themselves given potentially conflicting 
commitments to patient care, funded research, and training – which may need as yet undeveloped 
ethical and legal solutions. This is especially true for academic organizations that, in their own 
operations and in their agreements with commercial partners, promote discovery for the benefit 
of future generations as they care for those currently afflicted. As Case Study 1 suggests, ethical 
conduct even by prominent organizations can no longer be taken for granted. 
 
When it seemed in the 1990s that physician groups, hospitals anchoring organized systems of 
care, and health maintenance organizations would be responsible for managing cost and quality 
at the group level, there was a surge of interest in “organizational ethics,” which many 
physicians resisted as contrary to the traditional primacy of individual patient interests.24  
Although the value-based care models of today seem less likely than “managed care” a 
generation ago to raise the specter of profit-motivated rationing, more work needs to be done on 
the ethics of organizations such as ACOs that care for defined populations. 
 
III. Professional Self-regulation and Market Competition 
 
Case Study 2: You are a practicing physician appointed by the governor to serve on the state 
medical board. Part of the state’s Medical Practice Act provides that a physician may not 
prescribe medication in the absence of an established physician-patient relationship. This was 
enacted mainly because of concern over controlled substances. A for-profit company recently 
started operating in your state. The company signs contracts with large employers giving their 
workers telephone access to licensed physicians for medical consultations. You and the other 
physicians on the medical board, who have a voting majority, agree to adopt an emergency rule 
stating that a physician-patient relationship may not be established by telephone, and you notify 
the company that its physicians therefore may not prescribe medication over the phone. You 
adopt the rule knowing that the company’s physicians never prescribe controlled substances, 
and that many physicians in the state prescribe medication by telephone when “on-call” for 
other physicians’ patients, which the medical board regards as acceptable. How do you justify 
the new rule?  How would you respond to a lawsuit alleging that the medical board violated the 
federal antitrust laws by acting anti-competitively?    
 
Many ethical challenges for value-based health care relate to longstanding but inefficient 
professional practices. The medical profession’s privilege to self-regulate carries with it a 
significant risk of economically self-interested conduct that raises prices, reduces access to care, 
and discourages innovations in delivering health care or promoting health. Sometimes, such 
conduct violates federal and state “antitrust” laws that protect market competition in the private 
economy. However, self-regulation also promotes many desirable attributes of medical 
professionalism: expertise, diligence, loyalty, good character, altruism, charity, and collegiality. 
In an article describing lawyers rather than physicians, Professor Ronald Gilson asks a key 
question: “Is market power a precondition to professionalism?”25  Economists have been divided 
on the answer. When health care costs began to rise in the 1960s, Milton Friedman argued that 
eliminating professional licensing would lower prices yet maintain ethics, while Kenneth Arrow 
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claimed that professional ethics helps fill information gaps between physician and patients, 
thereby improving efficiency.26,27  Each of them eventually won a Nobel Prize in economics! 
 
A. The Federal Antitrust Laws 
 
The Sherman Antitrust Act (passed in 1890) declares “contracts, combinations, and conspiracies 
in restraint of trade” to be illegal, and empowers both the government and private parties to bring 
suit.28  Nonetheless, medical associations have routinely denied membership and the business 
connections and resources associated with it to physicians who deviated from professional norms 
regarding the economics of medical practice. In the 1940s, the United States Department of 
Justice brought criminal charges against the American Medical Association for organizing a 
physician boycott of a group health plan.29  By 1980, the Supreme Court had firmly applied the 
antitrust laws to the “learned professions.”30  Still, physicians accustomed to exercising medical 
authority collectively – and to having commercial actors such as hospitals and insurers defer to 
their collective judgment (which was routine for decades) – do not always realize that their 
conduct might violate antitrust law. Why shouldn’t the surgeons already practicing at the local 
hospital decide that their town has enough surgeons, or MD-physicians deny hospital privileges 
to professionals whom they regard as lower quality, such as DO-physicians or nurse 
practitioners?  Why shouldn’t two practice groups treat each other collegially -- agreeing not to 
recruit each other’s staff, or not to advertise their services in the other’s neighborhood, or not to 
both offer the same specialized services?   
 
B. Physician-Hospital Relations 
 
The unusual relationship between US physicians and hospitals accounts for much of the 
confusion over antitrust law and medical practice. Most American hospitals are non-profit 
organizations with a “voluntary, self-governing” medical staff comprised mainly of 
economically independent, private-practice specialists from the community who admit patients 
and use (at no cost to them) the hospital’s resources to care for those patients. In other countries, 
family physicians typically have private offices but specialist physicians are hospital employees. 
The American approach is the product of a complex history: contributing factors include the 
conditions of federal funding for hospital construction after World War II, state laws that 
prohibit direct employment of physicians as the “corporate practice of medicine,” private (Joint 
Commission) accreditation standards on which Medicare payment is based that view hospitals as 
under professional control, and the practicalities of generating hospital revenues from physician 
referrals in a non-universal health care system.  
 
Because the medical staff model of hospital operations puts independent physicians in the 
position of collectively monitoring one another and judging new applicants, physicians who are 
disciplined or excluded can allege an economic “conspiracy” against them. Antitrust lawsuits in 
connection with hospital privileges became frequent enough that Congress passed a special law 
(the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986) conferring legal immunity on bona fide peer 
review activities – protection that physicians demanded in order to continue serving on medical 
staff committees.31,32  After Medicare changed its payment policies in the 1980s to encourage 
hospital cost containment, physicians accustomed to “open” medical staffs also sued hospitals 
and organized medical groups for excluding them from contracts to provide services in hospital-
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based departments such as anesthesiology, radiology, and emergency medicine. These suits were 
usually unsuccessful, as courts concluded that competition between hospitals was more 
significant than competition within hospitals – foreshadowing a more organization-based 
approach to hospital care. 
 
C. Health Care Consolidation 
 
In recent years, the industrialization of the health care system has altered the pattern of antitrust 
litigation. Individual physicians are less often involved as plaintiffs or defendants, in part 
because many physicians are now employees of hospitals and other organizations, and 
employees cannot be sued as conspirators with one another or with their employers. Most legal 
disputes over competition today involve preventing anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions 
between hospitals, between health insurers (sometimes including pharmacy benefit managers), or 
between hospitals and large physician group practices.  
 
These cases are usually brought by government antitrust enforcers such as the U.S. Department 
of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and state attorneys general.33  Mergers are analyzed 
by defining the geographic market (e.g., Chicago) and the product market (e.g., acute care 
hospital services), estimating the economic effects (e.g., higher prices) of reducing the number of 
competitors, and determining whether any competitive benefits (e.g., reducing production costs, 
upgrading quality control systems) outweigh the likely harms from the challenged transaction.34  
Recent antitrust litigation has focused as well on contract terms imposed on other parties by 
dominant hospitals or health insurers that have the effect of preventing new competitors from 
entering the market.35  Still, the hospital and health insurance sectors have become much more 
consolidated over the past two decades, putting into question the effectiveness of antitrust law in 
protecting competition in the health care sector.36,37 Of particular concern is that U.S. antitrust 
laws are not well suited to undoing (as opposed to preventing) excessive consolidation, or to 
keeping price and output at competitive levels in consolidated markets.  
 
D. The Competitive Effects of Regulation and Self-Regulation 
 
Some of the most interesting disputes under antitrust law concern the relationship between 
market competition in health care and other health-related laws. Litigation involving 
pharmaceutical companies, for example, often relates to the anti-competitive effects of using 
FDA rules (e.g., those created by the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984) to delay market entry of low-
cost generic drugs.38  For physicians and other professionals, the Supreme Court ruled in 2015 
that state licensing boards controlled by members of the regulated profession can be sued for 
federal antitrust violations if their regulatory actions are not supervised by actual state 
government.39,40  This decision limiting “state action immunity” has important implications for 
the structure and operation of self-regulatory bodies in many professions, which often control 
entry of potential competitors by setting rules that favor established practice styles or asserting 
that services are being delivered by unauthorized individuals. Echoing Case Study 2, for 
example, after the Texas Medical Board had acted repeatedly to discourage telemedicine, an 
antitrust suit led the Texas legislature to enact new rules that permit greater flexibility, promoting 
both competition and innovation.41,42  Antitrust law can even reach situations that seem mainly 
bioethical in nature but that have commercial implications, such as collectively agreed 
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limitations promulgated by a professional specialty society on the money that fertility clinics 
may pay to young women for egg donation.43 
 
 
IV. Fraud and Abuse 
 
Imagine the following three scenarios, loosely based on the facts of actual legal cases: 
 
 A medical device company pays a physician a small fee for every patient he refers to 
use the company’s heart monitoring device. 
 Dr. Brown is a 25% investor in an imaging facility. He sends all of his patients to this 
facility for imaging services, and, at the end of the year, Dr. Brown earns a share of 
the facility’s profits. 
 Mercy Hospital bills the Medicare program several thousands of dollars for a full 
multi-use vial of Herceptin for each breast cancer patient treated, but the hospital 
can—and often does—use the same vial of Herceptin for multiple patients.  
 
Each of these situations raises legal and ethical challenges. How should the law interject to 
regulate or eliminate them, if at all?  
 
Estimates suggest that ten percent or more of health care spending may be due to fraud and 
abuse,44 ranging from providing unnecessary services (abuse), on one end, to upcoding for care 
provided or billing for care that was not provided at all (fraud), on the other. Since the inception 
of Medicare, laws have increasingly attempted to root out fraud and abuse, although with limited 
success. Increased enforcement efforts during the Obama Administration identified and 
prosecuted especially egregious offenders. Yet it is a problem that will only be solved with 
structural and cultural changes. Physicians and other individual practitioners can play an 
important role by resisting incentives to bill more and do more. 
 
Prior to the ACA, CMS paid claims with minimal investigation, after which the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) attempted to recoup illegal payments, an approach known as “pay and chase.” The 
ACA introduced a more proactive strategy, using algorithms to identify fraudulent claims before 
payment. Although more successful, it still captures only a small percentage of cases of fraud 
and abuse.  
 
A. False Claims, Kickbacks, and Self-Referral 
 
Fraud and abuse laws aim to identify illegal practices that unnecessarily drive up the cost of 
health care, to recoup some of the unwarranted spending, and to target and punish wrongdoers. 
These laws are defined in federal and state statutes, as well as in guidance issued by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG).  
 
The oldest federal anti-fraud law is the 1863 Civil False Claims Act (FCA), which broadly 
prohibits defrauding the government.45 In health care, the FCA prohibits knowing submission of 
any false claim to the federal government, such as seeking payment for services not provided or 
provided in a way that does not meet program standards on, for example, quality and reporting. 
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The FCA is notable for “qui tam,” or whistleblower provisions, which allow anyone who knows 
of a violation to file an action on behalf of the government and to receive a percentage of 
recovered damages. A majority of successful FCA cases are brought in this way by employees 
who become frustrated with corporate practices, by competitors, or by patients. Violators face 
civil penalties up to $11,000 per claim plus three times wrongfully billed amounts and, in the 
most severe cases, exclusion from participation in Medicare and Medicaid. 
 
The federal anti-kickback statute (AKS) is narrower and prohibits bribes or kickbacks, whether 
in cash or kind, for referrals or generation of business that is payable by a federal health care 
program.46 Because it is a criminal law, it includes an intent requirement— that a violation be 
knowing and willful—but that standard is met if one purpose of an arrangement is unlawful, 
even if there are also legitimate purposes.47 For example, waiving co-payments for Medicare 
patients can be a violation of this law if one purpose is to induce patients to use more care, which 
can drive up Medicare spending. Physicians and others should be concerned about AKS because 
violations are punishable by up to 5 years in prison, as well as by other criminal and civil 
penalties. Possible sanctions include steep fines and exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid.  
 
When the Medicare inpatient Prospective Payment System was introduced in the 1980s, capping 
payment for hospital stays, various services moved from hospitals to outpatient settings. Many 
physicians invested in these ancillary care facilities, including clinical laboratories, imaging 
centers, and ambulatory surgery centers. In 1989, Congress passed the Ethics in Patients 
Referrals Act,48 which prohibits financial relationships that can lead to overutilization. It and its 
successors, called the “Stark laws” after their strongest proponent, former Rep. Pete Stark, 
prohibit referrals for “designated health services” to facilities in which a physician or physician’s 
family member has a financial interest, unless an exception applies. The Stark laws have no 
intent requirement, which means merely acting outside the permitted bounds triggers civil (but 
not criminal) penalties. The penalties are substantial, however, and may include exclusion from 
Medicare and Medicaid. Bills for services that violate AKS or Stark are considered false claims, 
and therefore are actionable under the FCA as well. Both AKC and Stark have carve-outs by 
statute or regulation, which explicitly make some activity permissible. For example, AKC “safe 
harbors” and Stark exceptions allow many arms-length transactions that do not reward patient 
referral, such as salaried employment and various payments at fair market value.  
 
B. Structural Causes of Fraud and Abuse 
 
Structural forces exacerbate fraud and abuse. The most important is how the United States pays 
for health care. Any payment system creates incentives and opportunities for abuse or fraud.49 A 
fee-for-service system creates strong incentives for using more care, particularly when the 
recipient relies on professional advice regarding its necessity and the bill is mainly paid by third 
parties. When a physician gets paid once for an office visit, again for a lab test, and a third time 
for imaging—if she has an ownership interest in the laboratory and imagining facility—she has 
an incentive to do more, even if just to rule out a low-probability event. She also has an incentive 
to charge, or at least refrain from questioning, a high price. 
 
Private insurance companies have weaker incentives to combat health care fraud than one might 
expect, and may even compound it. A physician told one us a story of providing a routine service 
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for a patient with diabetes. When he submitted a bill to the Medicare managed care plan, he got a 
warning reminding him that the patient had diabetes and asking if he wanted to add a modifier to 
the claim indicating the complexity of the service. This modifier would help the insurance 
company maximize its revenue because Medicare “risk-adjusts” its payment to health plans 
based on the health status of its covered population. The physician changed the bill, even though 
he believed the initial coding was correct. He said the company would stop sending him patients 
if he refused.  
 
Although the evidence is mixed regarding associations between corporate form and fraud, the 
United States is an extreme outlier among nations in how for-profit entities permeate its health 
care system. Even if nonprofit organizations often behave no better than their for-profit peers, 
profit potential leads to abuses, a fact illustrated by the proliferation of high-profile and high-
dollar fraud prosecutions. Fraud and abuse claims against pharmaceutical companies are not the 
most common, but are some of the biggest. The DOJ settled with GlaxoSmithKline in 2012 for 
$3 billion in civil and criminal penalties and with Pfizer in 2018 for $2.3 billion, including a $1.3 
billion criminal penalty for off-label promotions and kickbacks. DaVita Healthcare Partners paid 
$350 million in 2018 to settle claims of illegal kickbacks, and soon after set aside an additional 
$495 million in case ongoing fraud litigation goes badly for it. These companies engaged in 
systemic patterns of fraud and abuse.  
 
Laws themselves exacerbate fraud and abuse. Compounding the piecemeal payment structure is 
the separation between provider and facility payments, which is a relic of state laws that attempt 
to protect doctors from the corrupting influence of business managers. Yet, this separation 
complicates billing and referral patterns, which can create opportunities for and obfuscate 
overuse and fraud.  
 
C. Seeking Cultural as Well as Structural Change 
 
Real solutions to fraud and abuse are more complex than passing and enforcing laws, even 
though monitoring and enforcement will always be needed. Simpler payment and delivery 
systems can make opportunities for abuse fewer, and can make fraud easier to detect. Physicians 
are increasingly being employed by hospitals and large group practices, which could reduce 
various parties’ incentives to pay individual physicians to boost referrals, and could make 
violations easier to identify by auditing contracts and imposing compliance obligations on 
provider organizations. Good hospital-based compliance programs might significantly reduce 
egregious offenses.  
 
Changing professional culture is an indispensable part of combatting fraud and abuse, and should 
be integrated into physician education and training. A recent article highlighted the continued use 
of medical interventions after research disproves their value, focusing on stents for stable cardiac 
patients.50 The article describes Grand Rounds at Barnes Jewish Hospital, where an expert first 
discussed his individual patient who fared well without a stent and then presented randomized 
clinical trials showing stents to be no more effective than less invasive treatments in stable 
patients. He then asked how many doctors in the room would stent the patient he first described, 
and half still raised their hands. Such instincts reflect a deep culture of ratcheting up care 
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delivery in response to the development of promising technology, but not backing off when 
evidence refutes the promise. 
 
Health care will always be ripe for profitmaking. Physicians are uniquely positioned to—and 
have a responsibility to—resist incentives to overuse care or reap unearned profits and report 
those who are doing otherwise.  
 
V. Privacy and Confidentiality 
 
Case Study 3:  You are a physician treating a young MSM patient. After reviewing blood tests 
taken as part of his annual physical, you determine he has seroconverted to being HIV+. You 
know he has previously attempted suicide, and you are worried about how he will take the news.  
 
There are a number of things you would like to know to help you provide better care, but the 
patient has been reticent about sharing details of his personal life. Does he have a primary 
partner or multiple partners? Does he engage in significant drug use? Does he currently engage 
in sex work?  Can you “Google stalk” him to uncover relevant non-health information? Read the 
public content of his Facebook profile? Look at police records available from public databases? 
Or would those kinds of searches violate his privacy rights? You also wonder about your 
obligations to public health authorities or his prior partners to provide information regarding 
his seroconversion. 
 
The physician-patient relationship requires trust and the free flow of information within, but not 
outside, the health care setting. Twenty-five years ago, patients’ informational privacy was 
protected by a set of loosely defined professional commitments and seldom-enforced state laws 
generally conferring on physicians rather than patients the ownership of the paper charts in 
which sensitive information had been recorded. Today, protecting digital information that can be 
remotely appropriated, aggregated, and misused is not only an ethical requirement but also a 
legal one for physicians, nurses, and hospitals – an obligation primarily met through compliance 
with detailed federal regulations. At the same time, under certain circumstances these actors have 
a legal duty to report information regarding patients and others, including to law enforcement 
and public health authorities.  
 
Four trends in patient and physician attitudes towards health privacy are worth highlighting. 
First, patients are demanding autonomy to direct their own care, and doing so requires them to 
have greater access to and control of their personal information. Second, new information and 
communication technologies such as telemedicine and AI-based predictive analytics promise 
greater clinical efficiency and effectiveness. Third, there is increasing interest in genetic 
information. More individuals are using commercial gene analysis to learn their ancestry and 
their medical predispositions, information that also has important ramifications for genetically 
related family members. 
 
Finally, the collateral consequences of leaked health information are increasingly serious. Many 
purveyors of non-health care services are “data hungry,” and public disclosure of health 
information can be devastating. Moreover, law enforcement is making increasing use of 
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databases connected to genetic testing in ways that may result in police interactions or even 
criminal charges for patients and their family members.  
 
A. The Duty to Protect Information Under HIPAA 
 
The main laws that govern the privacy obligations of physicians and other care providers are the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)51, regulations issued 
under HIPAA by DHHS, and the amendments contained in the Health Information Technology 
for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009.52 Collectively, we can refer to these 
sources as “the HIPAA regime.” In broad strokes, the HIPAA regime requires “covered entities” 
to maintain the confidentiality of “protected health information” (PHI), using or disclosing PHI 
only in permitted ways.  
 
The HIPAA privacy rule defines PHI as “individually identifiable health information” regardless 
of the medium, electronic or otherwise, in which it is held.53 Individually identifiable health 
information is information that is a subset of health information, including demographic 
information collected from an individual, that: 
 
(1) Is created or received by a covered entity or employer; and 
 
(2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an 
individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future 
payment for the provision of health care to an individual; and 
 
(i) That identifies the individual; or 
 
(ii) With respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be 
used to identify the individual.54 
 
Health care providers are covered entities, as are health plans and health care clearinghouse 
organizations. Covered entities are required to: 
 
(1) adopt internal procedures to protect the privacy of PHI;  
(2) train employees regarding privacy procedures;  
(3) designate a privacy officer;  
(4) secure patient records that contain protected information; and 
(5) establish and enforce agreements with “business associates” that are not themselves 
covered entities to ensure privacy protection for any PHI those organizations have access 
to.55 
 
The definition of “business associates” is expansive, and includes anyone who “creates, receives, 
maintains, or transmits protected health information” for claims processing or administration, or 
in connection with accounting, legal, management, or other services.56 
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The HIPAA regime creates a default rule that no protected health information can be used or 
disclosed unless one of the recognized exceptions apply. One of the leading health law textbooks 
summarize these exceptions:57 
 
 PHI can be disclosed to the individual or the individual’s personal representative (with 
special rules if there are concerns about abuse or neglect). 
 
 PHI can be disclosed for “treatment, payment, or health care operations” with the 
patient’s general consent. Disclosure for payment or health care operations must be the 
“minimum necessary” for the permitted use (a standard that also applies to authorized 
disclosures). Disclosure for treatment is not subject to that limitation, reflecting long-
standing professional preferences and the perceived exigencies of medical care. 
 
 PHI can be disclosed where the entity receives a more specific “valid authorization” from 
the patient, typically via a signed document that may vary depending on whether it is a 
general authorization or one that complies with special rules governing psychotherapy 
notes, marketing uses, or the sale of information. 
 
 A subset of PHI can be disclosed without written authorization in certain situations after 
giving the patient an opportunity to object. For example, basic information about an 
individual’s identity and condition can be added to the hospital directory and made 
available to callers if the individual does not object, and can even be provided in 
emergency circumstances if doing so is consistent with any known patient preferences 
and is in the best interests of the patient. 
 
 PHI can be disclosed without authorization or agreement in roughly a dozen categories of 
special circumstances, e.g., where the disclosure is required by law. 
 
 A “limited data set” that excludes most identifying information can be disclosed for use 
in public health, research, and operations. Limited types of PHI may also be disclosed in 
carefully circumscribed circumstances for institutional fundraising and by health plans 
involved in underwriting decisions. 
 
 Covered entities are also permitted to disclose PHI “incident to use[s] or disclosures 
otherwise permitted or required” so long as the covered entity has followed the standards 
governing the minimum necessary disclosure of information and has put in place proper 
administrative, physical, and technical safeguards. 
 
Two points are worth highlighting. First, many health care providers and hospitals use the “valid 
authorization” pathway -- including when patients first join a medical practice – to comply with 
the law. Second, when it comes to research use of patient data, the HIPAA regime allows data to 
be shared by removing a set of 18 specified identifiers such as names and email addresses, in 
which case the data will be treated as not being PHI under the law.58 
 
B. Other Medical Privacy and Mandatory Reporting Laws 
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Beyond HIPAA, other laws protect patient privacy as to specific kinds of information. At the 
federal level, these include the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA)59 
and the Privacy Act of 197460 (governing the use of information collected by federal agencies)61. 
Many states have their own statutes governing the confidentiality of patient data,62,63 which may 
be stricter than HIPAA. Private lawsuits are not available under the HIPAA regime, but breaches 
of patient confidentiality can give rise to substantial liability under state laws governing breach 
of contract, malpractice, general negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
fraud/misrepresentation.64,65 
 
In some instances, the law requires physicians to break confidentiality and reveal information to 
relevant parties. Most states require physicians and others to report abuse of children or 
vulnerable adults. For example, Florida law requires that a physician “who knows, or has 
reasonable cause to suspect, that a vulnerable adult has been or is being abused, neglected, or 
exploited shall immediately report such knowledge or suspicion to the central abuse hotline.”66 
Under state law, physicians also typically must report knife or gunshot wounds to the police.67 A 
third common category pertains to certain contagious or transmissible diseases, including 
sexually transmitted diseases, which statutes typically require to be reported to public health 
authorities. Beyond these statutory examples, judicial decisions have imposed on physicians a 
duty to warn others who may be at risk; these include cases involving contagious diseases68, 
patients with mental illness who threaten identified persons69, and the offspring of patients who 
carry a hereditary disorder70. These legal duties to disclose vary by state and often turn on the 
specific facts at issue.71 
 
C. Privacy and System-Based Practice 
 
While this discussion has focused on individual physicians, health care institutions also have a 
major role to play in patient privacy. They must educate their staff about HIPAA and other 
privacy laws, put policies in place that ensure compliance, provide a high level of corporate data 
security, and respond effectively to any data breaches that may occur. It is important for health 
care institutions to honor HIPAA’s respect for patient rights, rather than citing it inappropriately 
as a “bogeyman” or “conversation ender” when, for example, patients request access to their own 
health records. Institutional culture is equally valuable for preventing quotidian violations of 
patient privacy that usually go uncorrected – for example, discussing a patient in an elevator 
where other patients may be in earshot72, or posting an x-ray or an image from a particularly 
challenging surgery on Facebook. As health care systems come to rely on sophisticated outsiders 
to augment services that were traditionally offered in-house, it is essential that the vendors 
selected and the flow of information among them reflect the highest standards of data security 
and privacy protection. These include e-prescribing practices, secure communications methods, 
Ransomware response plans, and policies for dealing with inadvertent disclosure.73  
 
Many academic medical centers also collect, store, and conduct research on biospecimens 
obtained from patients. Recent changes to the federal “Common Rule” governing research ethics 
in the United States (still not in effect, as of this writing) provide new methods for patient 
consent relating to biospecimens. In the past, a researcher could remove identifiers from the data, 
seek study-specific consent, or follow institutional procedures for waiver of consent.74 The 
revised regulations permit “storage and maintenance of identifiable biospecimens for potential 
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secondary research if sources give their broad consent and the organization’s Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) determines that such consent was properly obtained and that storage 
provisions to protect confidentiality are adequate.” The regulations permit secondary research on 
properly stored biospecimens without additional consent if the IRB, again conducting only a 
limited review, “finds that the research is within the scope of that consent, provisions to protect 
confidentiality are adequate, and the study plan does not include returning individual research 
results.”75 It remains to be seen how many researchers make use of these new opportunities and 
how they play out in practice. 
    
Going beyond the existing law, a systems-level approach presses forcefully on several questions: 
First, to what extent do attempts to rein in health care costs in the United States require more 
access to patient data? Second, should the legal system focus not just on protecting patient health 
care data, but also on the broader category of patient health data or even data relevant to 
health?76,77,78  In a world that takes seriously the social determinants of health, the physicians of 
tomorrow may want to use data generated from social media, fitbits, shopping habits, etc. in 
formulating the best treatment for their patients. At what point does the collection and sharing of 
such data become problematic? Do we need to move away from the current United States health 
privacy approach, which operates differently by sector and custodian, to a more European 
approach that applies uniform protection to personal data regardless of who generates or 
transmits it?79  In determining when to breach confidentiality to protect other patients or the 
public’s health, should potential stigma or possible threats to members of vulnerable minority 
groups (e.g., the patient in Case Study 3) outweigh the duty to disclose? What happens to trust 
when a physician is expected to play “double agent” with patient information? What should 
patients be told when forming a clinical relationship about the circumstances under which their 
private information might be disclosed? 
 
VI. Health Insurance 
 
Imagine that you are a patient arriving for scheduled surgery at a hospital that is in your 
insurance network. You studied your health insurance policy and understood that you would pay 
a $250 deductible and 10% of the rate your insurer had negotiated for the surgery, which you 
estimated to be about $1,000 in all. When the bill arrives, it is for $5,273, including a charge for 
an out-of-network anesthesiologist that your insurance will not pay. 
 
Or imagine that you are a doctor treating a patient with cancer. You would like to prescribe a 
treatment regimen that you know works well for this type of patient and cancer, but the patient’s 
insurance might not pay for it. Even if the insurer confirms coverage, the patient’s share of the 
cost might still make treatment unaffordable.  
 
These scenarios occur and persist uniquely in the United States because of its idiosyncratic 
system for financing health care. A century ago, people who needed medical care simply paid for 
it. Medical advances and industrial growth have made services so expensive that good insurance 
is necessary to access good medical care.80 For most doctors and hospitals, insurance is also the 
key to being paid. Laws that influence the structure of insurance are therefore important for 
physicians to understand, both for their patients and for themselves.  
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Financing health care in the United States is more complicated than in peer nations because most 
countries have a universal, or near universal, public system that pays for baseline medical care. 
This is often referred to as “single payer,” even though most countries also have a secondary 
system of private insurance. The United States, in contrast, relies on a patchwork of public and 
private financing with gaps that leave 10 percent of the population uninsured, even after the 
ACA’s coverage gains. 
 
This convoluted system of financing profoundly affects the practice of medicine. A patient’s 
resources—financial and intellectual—can have a significant impact on access to medical care 
even for people with decent insurance coverage. Can the patient afford her health plan’s cost-
sharing obligations? Can she navigate the complexity of her insurance benefits and find the care 
she needs within the health plan’s provider network? Can she take time off work for 
appointments, especially if a limited provider network requires her to travel farther for care?  
 
Similarly, physicians must decide where in the system to practice and then negotiate various 
agreements to do so. Once practicing, they will treat patients with different types, levels, and 
terms of coverage. Even though most doctors – quite understandably – would rather not have to 
think about how their patients will pay for medically indicated care, health insurance can 
influence a patient’s ability to get well as much as any other factor. Physicians have no choice 
but to take note. 
 
A. Insurance Coverage in the United States 
 
Just over one-third of the U.S. population has public health insurance, mostly Medicare and 
Medicaid.81 For select populations, the government provides care directly through the Indian 
Health Services, Veterans Health Administration, and federally qualified community health 
centers. Medicare, a federal program, covers 57 million older Americans and some people with 
disabilities. Medicaid, which is funded primarily by the federal government but administered 
differently by each state, has become the largest insurer in the United States.82 It began as a 
program to cover poor people receiving cash welfare. Over time, it expanded to pregnant women 
and children whose families earned just above the welfare income thresholds.83 In 1997, in turn, 
the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) was created for children above Medicaid’s 
income thresholds.  
 
In the ACA, Congress attempted to make Medicaid a more nationally uniform program for the 
poor by extending eligibility to all nonelderly poor earning up to 138% of the federal poverty 
level (just under $35,000 USD for a family of four in 2018). This expansion was challenged 
legally. In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutionally “coercive” for 
Congress to force states to expand their programs on pain of losing all federal Medicaid funding, 
rather than just the incremental funding associated with the additional beneficiaries.84  The effect 
of this decision was to make expansion optional for the states. As of March 2019, 36 states and 
Washington, DC have embraced the Medicaid expansion, while 14 states have not yet done so.85  
 
Private financing includes employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI), individual health 
insurance, charity care, and out-of-pocket payments. Without insurance, most people cannot 
afford more than very basic services, and some hospitals will not admit someone for care without 
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proof they can pay. Annual per person medical spending in the United States is over $10,000, 
while median household income before taxes is approximately $55,000.86 The average bill for 
uncomplicated childbirth in the United States is over $10,000, while coronary artery bypass 
surgery costs on average over $78,000.87 Consequently, over half of Americans have private 
health insurance,88 mostly ESI, but with individual coverage increasing because of non-
discrimination rules and tax subsidies for working class enrollees under the ACA.89 In some 
cases, people pay for care out-of-pocket. Charity care for the uninsured is sometimes available 
from free clinics, providers, hospitals’ charity care programs, or drug assistance programs, but it 
is contingent and extremely limited in scope. 
 
B. Accepting Patients with Different Insurance Coverage 
 
Physicians and hospitals have significant discretion over which patients they treat, especially for 
non-emergency care. Private insurance generally pays (“reimburses”) health care providers the 
highest amount for a given service, but Medicare covers the elderly and disabled patients on 
whom most hospitals rely to fill beds and who represent a substantial portion of many 
physicians’ practices. Choosing to accept patients covered by Medicare or Medicaid comes with 
regulatory obligations. For example, billing a federal health insurance program makes a 
physician subject to federal fraud and abuse laws, described elsewhere in this Chapter, and both 
Medicare and Medicaid impose on health facilities detailed conditions of participation, which 
derive from state licensure, survey, and certification as well as Joint Commission accreditation 
requirements.  
 
Most hospitals and a majority of doctors accept both private and public health insurance, but 
some accept only private insurance and an increasing number, especially physicians in high-
demand practice areas in urban centers, do not accept insurance at all or charge retainer fees to 
join their practice. A recent study showed that rates of provider participation are highest in ESI, 
followed by private ACA marketplace plans, and lowest in Medicaid.90 The Mayo Clinic 
recently announced that it will prioritize privately insured patients over those with Medicare or 
Medicaid.91 Providers and facilities are more likely to accept Medicare than Medicaid because its 
reimbursement rates are higher.  
 
Although a physician, especially one who has already built a strong reputation, can make more 
money by accepting only privately insured or cash-pay (“concierge”) patients, a decision to do so 
exacerbates problems that lower-income and elderly people have in accessing health care. In the 
study referenced above, physician appointments were most available for patients with ESI and 
lowest for Medicaid patients.92  Although no law requires it, many physicians consider it an 
ethical obligation to accept public health insurance for at least a part of their patient population.  
 
C. Insurance Benefits and Cost-Sharing 
 
Health plans differ in the benefits they cover and what share of the costs patients must pay. 
Medicaid and Medicare coverage is governed by federal law, and benefits are consistent across 
states and plans. Private insurance varies more because it is primarily subject to state rather than 
federal regulation. Employers have wide discretion over benefits design and even though ESI is 
usually comprehensive, few legal requirements apply to it.  
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The ACA imposed federal law on individual insurance, requiring all plans to cover ten categories 
of essential health benefits, such as outpatient care, emergency services, hospitalization, 
maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance use disorder services, and prescription 
drugs.93 But the ACA gave states discretion in deciding exactly which services fall into these 
categories, so that even ACA marketplace plans may differ considerably from state to state.  
 
A few of the ACAs’ rules do extend to all private health plans, including ESI and individual 
coverage. These include coverage of certain preventive care without cost sharing, limits on 
annual out-of-pocket spending, and an end to annual and lifetime dollar limits on coverage (e.g., 
no more than $1 million in benefits over the life of a beneficiary). Some ACA requirements have 
been contentious. For example, preventive care under the ACA includes all FDA approved 
methods of contraception. Although the ACA and related federal regulations exempted houses of 
worship and offered accommodations to religious nonprofits, private companies successfully 
challenged the contraception mandate as a violation of their religious liberty and prevailed in the 
Supreme Court.94  The Trump Administration issued new regulations that are now, themselves, 
facing legal challenges. While these caseswork their way through the courts, some patients will 
have plans that fully cover contraception, while others might not.  
 
D. Provider Network Regulations 
 
Another effect of health insurance on medical practice is through network structure. Outside of a 
few well-established HMOs such as the Kaiser system in California or Group Health 
Cooperative of Puget Sound in Washington State, for many years health insurers did not limit 
enrollees to certain health care providers, or even make it financially more attractive to receive 
care in some settings than others. This changed in the 1980s, when laws were passed to allow 
state Medicaid programs and then private insurers to “selectively contract” with hospitals and 
physicians – negotiating lower fees in exchange for channeling more patients to these 
“preferred” providers.  
 
Although Medicare and most Medicaid programs accept all qualifying providers and suppliers, 
private insurers have significant discretion on how to compose their provider networks. In 
California, for example, the ACA health insurance exchange has opted not to contract with the 
largest, most expensive hospital systems, such as Cedars Sinai and UCLA Hospital in Los 
Angeles. Instead, they have contracted with smaller hospitals that are willing to offer lower 
prices.  
 
For patients, the shift to network-based coverage typically resulted in more favorable financing 
of “in-network” than “out-of-network” providers (e.g., 90% rather than 50% coverage), creating 
a strong incentive for them to seek in-network care. It also occasionally exposed them to 
shockingly high “surprise medical bills” from non-network providers who had not agreed to 
specific fees by contract with their insurer but unexpectedly became involved in their care.  
 
Initially, individual physicians applied to networks that insurers assembled and managed. Over 
time, physicians joined together in larger groups and associations, both for delivering care and 
for contracting with insurers. Today, over 40% of physicians are employees of hospitals, 
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compared to 25% as recently as 2012.95 In all these circumstances, physicians should carefully 
examine proposed contract terms, and should consult an attorney if any seem objectionable 
 
Some laws regulate provider networks. Several states apply legal standards for “network 
adequacy” to assure an appropriate geographic distribution of physician specialists. Some states 
prohibit or cap “surprise medical bills.”  States also may restrict particular contracting practices 
between insurers and providers, such as “most-favored nations” (MFN) clauses. These 
provisions, which require a provider to give the contracting insurer the lowest rate that provider 
offers to any payer, have been challenged under the antitrust laws because they discourage new 
insurers from entering the market. Another example is the “any willing provider” law, which 
requires an insurer to allow any provider into its network who is willing to sign the insurer’s 
standard contract. As of 2014, 27 states had these laws, sometimes limited to pharmacies and 
pharmacists.96 These laws make it easier for providers to remain in practice or enter new 
markets, but reduce insurers’ ability to bargain for lower fees in exchange for assured patient 
volume. 
 
E. The Cost of Complexity 
 
Although the details of health insurance may seem outside of the treatment relationship or 
secondary when time with patients is short, they likely are as important determinants of health 
outcomes as a good diagnosis and treatment regimen. In 2016, 50% of employer plans had a 
deductible of $1,000 or more for individual coverage, five times more than a decade prior.97 
If health care costs continue to rise and more individuals join health plans with high deductibles 
or narrow networks, these challenges will only become more acute as fewer patients are able to 
afford their assigned share of treatment costs.  
 
The multifaceted approach to paying for health care in the United States leaves significant gaps 
in who is covered and how meaningfully their coverage provides access to care. It also confuses 
patients and imposes burdens on providers. One of the greatest ironies in health policy is that 
physicians, fearful of the lower reimbursement rates associated with public insurance, have 
repeatedly blocked reforms aimed at more universal financing. However, piecemeal financing 
has drawn individual practitioners away from patient care and into paperwork; the resulting 
complexity is undoubtedly one of the greatest challenges practitioners now face.  
 
That physicians devote so much time to complying with the administrative requirements of 
multiple insurers and programs has motivated many to seek hospital employment, rather than 
continue to practice on their own. Hospital employment may mean lower lifetime earnings for 
some, but perhaps higher quality of life. If the United States had a created a baseline single-payer 
system as exists in its peer nations, this same quality of life might have been sustainable in more 
autonomous practice settings.  
 
VII. Informed Consent to Treatment 
 
Case Study 4: You are a young attending neurosurgeon at a major urban medical center with a 
well-regarded brain and spine institute. A 40-year-old woman with a recurrent pituitary tumor, 
originally treated elsewhere, consults you about additional surgery. She is having significant 
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symptoms and is very concerned that she will not live to raise her children to adulthood. You 
have only operated on a few recurrent brain tumors. You explain to her that it is a complex 
operation and outline the risks and benefits of being more or less aggressive in attempting to 
remove tumor regrowth. The institute where you work uses an interdisciplinary team approach, 
so you refer her for team-based pre-operative evaluation and counseling, which includes 
interactive, computer-based decision aids. At the end of that evaluation, the physician’s assistant 
presents her with a surgical consent form, reviews it carefully with her, and obtains her written 
agreement to remove as much of the tumor as possible in the judgment of the operating surgeon. 
On the morning of the surgery, you speak briefly with her, and she reiterates her confidence in 
your ability. Unfortunately, the surgery leaves her with significant neurological deficits, which 
she claims were not a risk she had wanted to take. Should she be able to sue you for failure to 
obtain her informed consent?  Should it matter that most of the information she received was 
provided by others on your team?  Should you have been required to disclose your relative 
inexperience?  What if part of the operation was done by a senior surgical resident under your 
supervision?  What if you have a consulting agreement with a surgical instrument company? 
 
Informed consent is one of the most important obligations of health professionals.  Ethically, the 
process of engaging a patient and eliciting that person’s informed consent to medical treatment 
has several benefits. It enables a desirable exchange of information regarding therapeutic 
objectives and the means available to achieve them, builds understanding and trust between the 
patient and the care team, aligns the expectations of both provider and patient regarding the 
course of care, and promotes collaboration between them that likely improves medical outcomes.  
 
A. The Ethical Consensus on Consent 
 
As an ethical matter, informed consent is now firmly embedded in physicians’ professional 
expectations of themselves.99  Broad acceptance of patient autonomy as a goal and obligation of 
medical practice is even carrying over to domains beyond consent-to-treatment. For example, the 
AMA and many other physician professional associations now recognize an ethical obligation of 
transparency and engagement following unexpected outcomes of care (see Medical Malpractice 
section of this chapter). Consent to participation in biomedical research – including threats to 
privacy – is also evolving as society acknowledges the therapeutic misconception often 
associated with biomedical research settings:  that participants in research studies may 
incorrectly assume that the white-coated, medically trained researchers they encounter are 
always acting as “doctors” would toward their “patients.” 
 
Whether informed consent truly shifts authority over treatment decisions from physician to 
patient, and whether that is always desirable, is a closer question. American physicians’ ethical 
embrace of honesty with patients is relatively recent; in 1960, physicians routinely withheld a 
cancer diagnosis from the patient (sharing it only with family members), arguing that shielding 
patients from despair was medically beneficial. Such paternalism would be unthinkable in 
modern medical practice, although a very limited “therapeutic privilege” not to disclose risks to 
emotionally fragile patients remains part of the law. Still, inherent tension exists between the 
“patient” role and the hoped-for autonomy expressed in the idea of informed consent, and it is 
unrealistic to expect that merely sharing information can overcome those limitations. Particularly 
in cases of serious, unexpected illness that imposes both a physical and an emotional burden, 
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patients remain dependent on (and may strongly desire) physician guidance, which physicians 
are ethically obligated to provide.100   
 
B. The Weaknesses of Consent in The Law 
 
The robust ethical grounding for informed consent is not matched in the law.101  American 
informed consent law typically applies only to surgery or other physically invasive procedures, 
and generally requires only the disclosure (without verifying comprehension) of risks, benefits, 
and treatment alternatives. Recognizing patient dependence, some countries require physicians to 
recommend a course of treatment. US law does not. Moreover, inadequate information only 
supports a lawsuit seeking damages for lack of informed consent in a narrow range of 
circumstances, although additional legal remedies exist where a physician blatantly disregards a 
patient’s right to information or engages in outright deception.102 
 
Informed consent law is not established as a nationally uniform standard by Congress but varies 
from state to state, usually as the result of judges deciding cases though sometimes in the form of 
statutes enacted by state legislatures. Except for egregious cases of medical procedures (or 
worse) done to patients without either knowledge or permission – which can lead to civil claims 
as well as criminal charges of battery – informed consent is considered part of the law of 
professional negligence (see Medical Malpractice section). Informed consent law requires 
patients seeking redress in court to demonstrate that the failure to disclose information both 
breached a legal duty and caused injury.  
 
State laws divide as to whether the sufficiency of disclosure should be set by professional custom 
as a “standard of care” (which seems contrary to the notion of informed consent being patient-
oriented) or based on what a reasonable patient would consider material to a decision (which 
seems more consistent with goals of patient autonomy).103  Texas takes a unique approach, 
empowering a public commission with physician leadership and attorney participation to 
distinguish between procedures that require specified disclosures and procedures that do not.104 
 
Even in states that apply a standard of disclosure highly favorable to patients, legal claims for 
lack of informed consent typically fail on the issue of causation. The undisclosed risk must be 
the risk that materializes and causes injury: if a patient is not told about a substantial risk of 
infection, but the post-surgical complication is something else, there is no legal claim for 
recovery. In nearly all states, moreover, the plaintiff must prove that a reasonable patient would 
not have undergone the treatment had sufficient disclosure been made.105  This means that, even 
though an undisclosed risk materialized with horrific effects, a patient generally has no legal 
remedy if treatment was medically indicated and was performed non-negligently because a 
reasonable person would have elected to undergo the procedure even if fully informed. An 
injured patient’s lawyer still may argue lack of informed consent to a jury as part of a broader 
malpractice suit in order to portray the physician as uncaring and potentially less attentive – and 
therefore more likely to have botched the procedure. In states that do not require expensive 
expert testimony to establish what should have been disclosed, moreover, plaintiffs’ lawyers may 
routinely allege lack of consent to pressure a malpractice insurer to settle and avoid the expense 
and uncertainty of trial. Standing alone, however, lack of informed consent is a weak legal claim. 
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C. Consent Involving Systems of Care 
 
The organizational role in informed consent has been mainly administrative: providing a physical 
venue for pre-surgical consultation and ensuring that forms are completed and signed as 
required. Particularly for surgery, hospitals have been regulated (and self-regulated through the 
Joint Commission) as staffed, equipped environments for physicians’ professional work rather 
than as clinical service providers in their own right. Unfortunately, combining time pressure with 
paperwork in health facilities has set a poor example for physicians and other health 
professionals by making “consenting” a patient into a procedural hurdle to be overcome in a 
short clinical encounter rather than a deliberate process of extended information exchange and 
shared decision-making. Recently, some professional organizations, physician practices, and 
hospitals have reversed this trend and implemented systems of patient education with 
audiovisual, often Internet-based aids that can be used iteratively to convey information, verify 
comprehension, and promote informed consent.106 
 
The growth of managed care and health systems has caused courts to rethink several aspects of 
informed consent law, as Case Study 4 illustrates. Established law focused on disclosing 
characteristics of the disease and possible treatments rather than of the physician or system of 
care. By contrast, “physician-specific” disclosure requirements have been imposed in several 
situations, obligating physicians to convey information about their clinical experience and 
measurable outcomes, financial incentives, and direct participation in the patient’s surgery 
(versus care by a physician in training or other assistant).107,108  This remains a work-in-progress, 
reflecting the growing pains associated with embedding physicians in a larger system and 
distinguishing among them, rather than assuming that all physicians are equally qualified and 
that treatment in different settings has the same risk-benefit profile. 
 
There are likely to be further pressures on informed consent as health care systems implement 
value-based care models. Eliciting patients’ goals for treatment, measuring outcomes that 
patients report, and incorporating a variety of organizational structures and contractual 
relationships that depart from the traditional one physician-one patient norm all increase 
potential liability. For example, attaching disclosure obligations to cross-cutting aspects of care 
(e.g., physicians’ financial incentives, conflicts of interest, or reliance on inter-professional 
teams) removes the “materialized risk” constraint that has limited legal recovery to a small 
subset of bad outcomes. Similarly, segmenting care into a number of tactical alternatives (e.g., 
the choice of surgical approach, the extent of resection) among which patients select may 
persuade courts to find that inadequate disclosure caused harm even when some course of care 
was clearly necessary and the treatment administered was performed properly. 
 
Another question raised in Case Study 4 that is being actively debated by courts and professional 
associations is whether the treating physician or surgeon must personally obtain a patient’s 
informed consent. Within organized systems of care, a process that involves multiple members 
of the clinical team and takes advantage of institutional resources seems more likely than a single 
conversation with a hurried physician to educate patients effectively about their choices, offer 
time for reflection and questioning, and enable patients to take an active role in decision-making. 
Exclusive control by an authoritative physician over the site and terms of the consent 
conversation may build trust and reinforce a physician’s sense of moral responsibility, but risks 
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perpetuating paternalistic attitudes and practices. Yet at least one court has ruled informed 
consent to be “non-delegable” by the attending surgeon, though the decision failed to distinguish 
between delegating the task and delegating the legal liability associated with doing the task 
poorly, confusion that may intensify as more physicians become hospital employees and the 
hospital thereby becomes legally accountable for physician negligence.109 
 
VIII. Medical Malpractice and Redressing Error 
 
Case Study 5: You are a general surgeon in private practice. Your patient, a young man, has 
significant symptoms of right-side inguinal hernia and has agreed to surgery at the hospital 
where you typically operate. He signs a consent form for right inguinal hernia repair at his pre-
op visit and again when he arrives at the hospital for surgery. However, neither form makes it 
into the electronic health record. He is brought into the OR and anesthetized. You and the other 
operating room personnel “huddle” and agree to a plan for right-sided surgery. Unfortunately, 
an emergency takes you out of the OR for half an hour. When you return, you quickly examine 
the patient and noting a likely left-sided hernia you proceed to repair that side, failing to operate 
on the right. When the patient wakes up in the PAR area, he is upset to find that the wrong 
hernia has been repaired. You immediately apologize, and arrange for him to return to the OR 
for additional surgery, which goes well. The following day, the hospital administrator visits the 
patient’s room and assures him that he will not be charged for his care. Several months later, he 
files a malpractice lawsuit against you and the hospital. Do you feel this is justified?  The 
hospital settles, and reports the payment to the state medical board and to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank.  Do you feel this is justified?  The state medical board investigates and 
decides to sanction you and assess a fine, which will be visible for ten years on the medical 
board’s public website, and which you will have to disclose to hospitals where you seek 
privileges for the remainder of your career.  Do you feel this is justified? 
 
Physicians are trained, skilled, hard-working, and committed professionals who fervently hope 
never to cause harm to their patients. Yet millions of patients suffer avoidable injuries from 
medical care each year, and thousands die as the result.110  As other chapters in this book have 
explained, poorly designed safety systems that fail to account for predictable human behaviors 
are largely responsible for medical errors, particularly in hospitals. Considering this state of 
affairs, it is both shocking that so many adverse outcomes happen unnecessarily, and heartening 
that so many more are prevented by the personal dedication of physicians, nurses, and other 
members of health care teams. 
 
When care does go badly, physicians can be held ethically and legally responsible for violating 
the “duty of care” they owe to their patients. As with the “duty of loyalty” (see section in this 
chapter on Conflict of Interest), the fiduciary duty of care requires physicians to act affirmatively 
for their patients’ benefit, faulting them as much for failure to diagnose or treat as for treatment 
done badly. Poor care – particularly if egregious or repeated – can subject physicians to 
professional discipline (including license suspension or revocation) by state medical boards. It 
can cause physicians to lose admitting or treatment privileges following peer review procedures 
undertaken by a hospital’s self-governing medical staff. In addition to these professional self-
regulatory responses, poor care can lead to private litigation by patients against physicians – 
medical malpractice lawsuits.  
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A. The Unusual Salience of Medical Malpractice 
 
Medical malpractice differs in several ways from other issues in health law and policy. It is 
almost entirely governed by state rather than federal law. Judges are more important than 
legislatures to how malpractice law develops, and no regulatory agencies play significant roles.  
The politics of altering malpractice law and associated procedures – called “tort reform” – 
involves well-funded constituencies outside of health care who exploit medical care to serve 
larger agendas involving the effect of private lawsuits (the “civil justice system”) on America’s 
economy and social fabric. In recent years, moreover, tort reform has become highly partisan, 
with Republicans and their corporate donors seeking to restrain litigation and Democrats and 
their trial lawyer donors seeking to expand it. 
 
Medical malpractice has unique emotional resonance with physicians. Many allegations of 
malpractice are felt as assaults on character and reputation, and as betrayals of the intimate bond 
between physician and patient   Malpractice law is part of “tort law,” which provides recourse 
for harms that do not fall within other legal regimes governing criminal conduct or contractual 
agreements. The purpose of a tort claim is simple: to recover compensation for wrongful injury, 
typically from an insurance company (e.g., automobile, property, or malpractice coverage). Yet 
most physicians consider a malpractice lawsuit tantamount to a criminal accusation, describing it 
using terms such as “charge,” “verdict,” and “guilt” (the usual tort terms are “claim,” 
“judgment,” and “liability”). Moreover, although much of the patient-physician relationship is 
defined by contract, most aspects of malpractice liability may not be modified by agreement 
between a physician and her patients (except perhaps to settle claims through private arbitration 
rather than in court).   
 
B. Malpractice Litigation 
 
To prevail in a medical malpractice suit, a lawyer representing a patient as “plaintiff” must 
establish several elements of the case by a “preponderance of the evidence” (meaning more 
likely than not, which is a much easier standard to meet than in a true criminal case, which must 
be proved “beyond a reasonable doubt”). First, the “defendant” physician must owe a legal duty 
to the plaintiff in the form of a physician-patient relationship. Second, the defendant must have 
violated that duty by failing to meet the “standard of care” customary among physicians in the 
defendant’s field and circumstances, which the law terms “professional negligence.”  Third, the 
plaintiff must have suffered injury, which can take the form of money expended (additional 
medical expenses) or unearned (lost wages from death or disability) and/or harm not usually 
measured in dollars (“pain and suffering”). Fourth, the defendant must have caused the plaintiff’s 
injury, both in the narrow sense of the injury not occurring but for the physician’s negligence and 
in the broader sense of it seeming reasonable to hold the physician (and therefore the physician’s 
liability insurer) financially responsible. 
 
Because physicians collectively determine the standards of practice to which they will be held in 
court, malpractice liability is to a large degree just another method of professional self-
regulation. The vast majority of malpractice claims are abandoned by the claimant or settled out 
of court (often without a formal lawsuit) with money paid by a liability insurance company. Still, 
physicians tend to regard a claim against them as an external and arbitrary threat. One reason is 
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that a binding decision can be rendered by a jury or judge with no medical training. Another 
reason is that both sides in a lawsuit hire physicians to serve as expert witnesses, and the 
plaintiff’s expert will report that the defendant was negligent. A third reason is that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers are paid a hefty percentage (around 40%) of any money they recover for their clients, 
which enables poor people to afford representation but which physicians see as an incentive to 
distort the facts. But the biggest reason may be that malpractice claims can be incredibly slow to 
resolve, with major claims often dragging out for five years or more. These years can be filled 
with stress, uncertainty, inconvenience, and even self-doubt for physicians. This can be 
compounded for those in traditional small practices who fear sudden, sharp increases in the cost 
of their malpractice insurance coverage or, as has occasionally happened, coverage becoming 
unavailable – putting their professional livelihoods at risk. 
 
C. Situating the “Malpractice System” in System-Based Care 
 
The medical malpractice system is seriously flawed as a method of either compensation or 
quality improvement. Several studies have established a two-sided mismatch between unsafe 
care and malpractice claims: many lawsuits do not reflect poor care, while the vast majority of 
injuries caused by medical errors are never redressed in court. The administrative costs 
(insurance adjusters, lawyers, expert witnesses, etc.) of compensating harm through malpractice 
claims consume roughly half of the available funds. Few opportunities exist in litigation to 
understand the causes of errors or improve safety for future patients. Fear of malpractice liability 
may lead physicians to make clinical decisions that do little to benefit patients but increase health 
care spending (“defensive medicine”). And the litigation process is convoluted, confrontational, 
and inhumane for nearly everyone involved. Yet most efforts to reform medical malpractice have 
tended to focus on only one piece of the problem – so-called frivolous suits and excessive awards 
– with the result being (perhaps) less of a bad system but certainly not a good system. 
 
Medical malpractice law has adapted in decentralized, state-by-state fashion to the expansion of 
corporate structures and systems of care. In the early 20th century, laws in most states shielded 
hospitals from liability by virtue of their status as charitable organizations, while holding 
physicians (usually surgeons) responsible for poor care by nurses and others under the “captain 
of the ship” doctrine. In recent decades, however, hospitals have been held “vicariously liable” 
for the negligence of health professionals whom they employ or hold out to the public as their 
agents (e.g., an emergency physician or radiologist). Hospitals may also be directly liable for 
negligence in granting medical staff privileges to physicians, for inadequately supervising 
physicians, and for failing to maintain a safe environment for patient care. Similar theories of 
liability have been applied to HMOs and other health plans, particularly in the 1990s when 
managed care seemed to be taking a more aggressive approach to costs by denying coverage for 
expensive treatments or obligating patients to receive care from particular hospitals and 
physicians. When individuals who have health insurance through their private employers bring 
lawsuits, however, a federal statute governing pensions and fringe benefits called ERISA (which 
stands for the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) may prevent them from 
recovering damages under either malpractice law or state insurance law. 
 
Malpractice insurance has also changed dramatically. Malpractice suits became more frequent 
and the damages awarded more generous in the 1970s, which was largely a consequence of 
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rising public expectations from improvements in medical technology and expertise along with 
expanded health insurance coverage). Commercial insurers therefore pulled back from an 
increasingly uncertain market, while companies owned by physicians (and hospitals) stepped in 
to fill the void. These companies dominated medical liability coverage for the next three decades, 
leveraging relationships with state and local medical societies to lobby for tort reform that had as 
its dominant objective keeping liability insurance available and affordable for individual 
physicians (and opposing system-based malpractice changes such as “enterprise liability” that 
would have assigned primary responsibility for errors to organizations rather than isolated 
professionals).  
 
As malpractice markets stabilized in the mid-2000s and more physicians became employees of 
hospitals and large medical practices, however, liability insurance diversified to encompass new 
approaches to risk-bearing such as captive insurers, risk-retention groups, and institutional self-
funding backstopped by excess coverage. There is undoubtedly some tension between physician 
control over medical care and corporate accountability; physicians who are employees may find 
it hard to speak up unless corporate culture encourages it. Moreover, corporate defendants are 
more likely than individual physicians to incur (and perhaps deserve) judgments against them 
that include substantial punitive damages. On the plus side, however, institutional coverage for 
medical liability is less vulnerable than individual coverage to periodic malpractice “insurance 
crises,” which tend to selectively burden a few “high-risk” specialties in states without tort 
reform. Institutional coverage also is better aligned with systems-based safety improvement 
strategies, and is more likely to have personnel and processes in place to support both affected 
professionals and injured patients. For example, physicians working in health systems can expect 
assistance in the event of serious error from dedicated patient safety officers, patient grievance 
counselors, and quality improvement support staff. These resources reflect not only greater 
financial capacity at the institutional level, but more detailed and demanding accreditation and 
regulatory requirements than apply to individual health professionals. 
 
D. Communicating and Resolving Patient Harm 
 
Insights from health systems science are enabling new generations of physicians to release 
malpractice policy from its unique professional and political history, and integrate it with other 
aspects of health law and professional ethics.111  This trend is illustrated by the growth of 
“communication and resolution programs” (CRPs). CRPs are organized responses to medical 
error that prioritize transparency, immediate assistance to patients and families, timely 
compensation for unreasonable care, safety improvement, and caregiver support. In roughly 20 
years, CRPs have moved from a few public and academic institutions such as the Veterans 
Administration hospital in Lexington, Kentucky and the University of Michigan into the medical 
mainstream, earning endorsement from the AMA, the American College of Surgeons, and other 
professional groups. 
 
Although CRPs are sometimes described as a form of “alternative dispute resolution” that 
substitutes for malpractice litigation, an ethical commitment to good patient care, respect, and 
teamwork lies at the heart of the CRP approach. Over a fifty-year period, physicians’ fear of 
being sued, adversarial tactics by plaintiffs’ lawyers, and a “deny and defend” mentality among 
liability insurers normalized the concealment of errors and the refusal to engage patients and 
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families when care went poorly. This is finally changing, as younger physicians who fully 
embrace shared decision-making and who tend to practice in more organized, less financially 
exposed environments apply lessons from patient safety science to their own workflow. Younger 
professionals would never question the ethical obligation to tell patients honestly what might 
happen during medical care (see Informed Consent section in this chapter). Unlike some of their 
predecessors, telling patients honestly what did happen during medical care is equally intuitive to 
these emerging professional leaders.  Still, as Case Study 5 implies, doing the right thing 
ethically will not always protect physicians from legal accountability.  
 
IX. Withholding and Withdrawing Care 
 
Case Study 6:  Mrs. C, 84, was admitted to the hospital with signs of dementia, including 
periodic confusion. She was not eating adequately; eventually, the care team inserted a 
nasogastric tube. She was no longer ambulatory and was confined to bed, unable to move from a 
semi-fetal position. She suffered from arteriosclerotic heart disease, hypertension, and diabetes 
mellitus; her left leg was gangrenous to her knee; she had several necrotic decubitus ulcers (bed 
sores) on her left foot, leg, and hip; an eye problem required irrigation; she had a urinary 
catheter in place and could not control her bowels; she could not speak; and her ability to 
swallow was very limited. However, she interacted with her environment in limited ways. She 
could move her head, neck, hands, and arms to a minor extent; she was able to scratch herself, 
and had pulled at her bandages, tube, and catheter; she moaned occasionally when moved or fed 
through the tube, or when her bandages were changed; her eyes sometimes followed individuals 
in the room; her facial expressions were different when she was awake than when she was 
asleep; and she smiled on occasion when her hair was combed, or when she received a 
comforting rub. After determining she was not capable of directing her own care, the court 
named her nephew as her legal guardian. The nephew petitioned to discontinue her feeding tube, 
which would lead to her death. Mrs. C’s guardian ad litem—the individual appointed by the 
court to protect her interests—opposed the move. How should their disagreement be resolved? 
What does the law permit? 
 
Case Study 6 is similar to ones that many clinicians encounter regularly across America.112  The 
“black-letter law”—meaning the law on the books—for these kinds of cases is relatively well-
established, though it differs to some extent by state. But the law “in action” is much fuzzier. As 
we will see, many states adopt standard-like approaches to the legal questions, leaving open 
difficult fact and value judgments and problems of application. Moreover, for every case that is 
litigated in this area there are tens or more that are resolved without a court ever considering the 
matter. Hospitals, care teams, patients, and their families are all “bargaining in the shadow of 
law,” in the sense that they are engaged in the private resolution of disputes under assumptions 
about what might happen if they went to court.113 And their perceptions of the law may be very 
different from its actuality. 
 
In situations involving withholding or withdrawing care, the law sometimes envisions an ideal 
world that is very different from what physicians see on the front lines.  Advance directives often 
fail to capture what patients would actually want and also are sometimes disregarded by 
physicians.114,115,116 The most recent approach to these decisions in some U.S. states, termed 
Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment (POLST), integrates patients, family members, 
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and physicians in end-of-life care planning, and has proven more successful at translating 
patients’ wishes into medical actions.117 Even POLST, however, may rely on assumptions about 
available physician time and training that are not always realistic.  
 
A. Legal Distinctions Based On Competency 
 
At one time, both in law and in ethics, the difference between withdrawing and withholding 
treatment was seen as important. It was argued that “it was permissible to withhold life-
sustaining treatment but not to withdraw such treatment, just as there is no obligation to come to 
someone’s rescue, but there is an obligation not to abandon a rescue.”118 Over time, though, both 
law and ethics have revisited this conclusion. Indeed, some now argue that it is worse to 
withhold than to withdraw because without trying a treatment, the opportunity to see if the 
treatment works is lost. Moreover, as Justice Brennan observed in his dissenting opinion in the 
Cruzan case, “If we did not recognize a right to have treatment withdrawn, many people might 
not seek care in the first place because they would be afraid of not being able to stop treatment 
once it was started.”119 While many physicians may still feel more uncomfortable withdrawing 
than withholding treatment, the law no longer imposes a distinction.120,121 
 
Instead, the law divides its analysis of both withdrawing and withholding care according to 
whether the patient is “competent” or “incompetent,” as those terms are used by the legal system. 
The law as to competent patients is today relatively straightforward. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health,122 is typically read as confirming the 
constitutional right of a competent patient to refuse medical treatment regardless of his or her 
medical condition.123,124 The case law typically grounds this right in conceptions of bodily 
autonomy and, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, can be seen as a “logical corollary of the 
doctrine of informed consent [in] that the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that 
is, to refuse treatment.”125  
 
The law as to patients not deemed competent is more complicated. As Rebecca Dresser has ably 
summarized, courts and legislatures in U.S. states have adopted three different approaches.126  
First, under the “subjective standard” (also called the “advance directive” approach), the 
treatment (or non-treatment) of the incompetent patient should reflect that patient’s previously 
expressed wishes. When there is a clear and applicable advance directive, or a proxy directive 
designating someone else to make decisions should the patient become incompetent, things run 
relatively smoothly. That said, even well-written advance directives may fail to provide for 
particular situations or ambiguities. Without a detailed specification in writing, some states have 
accepted evidence about a patient’s general or specific remarks about life-sustaining treatment to 
help guide decisions, but others have found such evidence too informal.127 
 
A second approach is the substituted judgment standard (also called the “limited-objective” 
standard). As the New Jersey Supreme Court described this approach in the Conroy case, 
decision-makers should permit an incompetent patient to forgo life-sustaining treatment “when 
there is some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused the treatment” and “it is 
clear that the burdens of the patient’s continued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits of 
that life for him.”128 This standard allows refusal of care despite relatively weak evidence of 
what the patient would have wanted (the subjective element) as long as objective judgments 
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about the patient’s quality of life with and without treatment accord with the available subjective 
evidence. 
 
A final approach is the “best interests” standard (also called the “objective standard”). This 
standard requires “decision-makers to assess and then balance different features of the individual 
incompetent patient’s medical situation, such as prognosis and quality of life with and without 
treatment. Judges and other decision-makers consider the burdens and benefits the individual 
patient would experience if life-sustaining interventions were provided, or conversely, 
forgone.”129 This determination does not turn on what a particular patient actually wanted, but 
what is judged to be in the patient’s best interests from an objective point of view. The best 
interests standard is most often used in cases where there is no evidence of what the patient 
would have wanted, which usually involve profoundly disabled patients who have never been 
competent.  
 
B. Revisiting End-of-Life Practices in Health Care Systems 
 
Existing law faces several new pressures that highlight institutional and systems-based issues. 
First, to what extent does it make sense to resolve disputes over withholding or withdrawing care 
in courtroom proceedings, as opposed to relying on hospital ethics committees, or other forms of 
dispute resolution? The prevailing practice has changed over time.130,131,132 Second, choices to 
pursue treatment impose significant costs on patients’ families and the health care system. To 
what extent can cost legitimately be considered in setting rules about care, or is it antithetical to 
medical ethics even to pose that question? Third, many physicians have strong beliefs about end-
of-life care. To what extent should hospital systems make efforts to accommodate physicians 
whose religious or conscientious beliefs prohibit withholding or withdrawing care?133  
 
Moreover, discussions about medical care at the end of life tend to quickly become politicized, 
which often erases any hope of maintaining privacy for the individuals involved, while also 
exposing health care systems to unwelcome if arguably necessary publicity. Consider the saga of 
Terri Schiavo, who spent fifteen years in a persistent vegetative state while her family, the 
courts, and Congress very publicly fought over what should be done.134 Or consider how a 
proposed provision in an early draft of the ACA to authorize Medicare reimbursement for 
physicians who engage patients in end-of-life care planning was distorted by partisanship into an 
accusation that the Obama administration was seeking to institute “death panels.”135 Finally, to 
what extent is dementia a challenge to the legal distinction between competence and 
incompetence in refusing care?136,137 What about a pre-dementia patient who asks for care to be 
withheld if dementia develops, but who after developing dementia seems to be happy and 
enjoying life? Are the pre-dementia individual and that individual’s later, demented self the same 
person from a moral perspective?  From a legal perspective? 
 
In Case Study 6, Mrs. C’s situation involves “withdrawing” care that has already started as 
opposed to “withholding” care that has not yet been initiated. Has this chapter helped you decide 
her case? The chapter has not discussed a third category, “physician assisted suicide” (sometimes 
called “medical aid in dying” by those who resist the “suicide” characterization), where the 
physician actively works to hasten death. It also has put aside special legal questions concerning 
withdrawing and withholding care for infants and other minors, where special rules and other 
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bodies of law (e.g., family law, child abuse and endangerment law) come into 
play.138,139,140,141,142,143,144  These are legally, medically, ethically, and socially contentious issues.  
 
X. Summary 
 
Law is a common feature of life, especially in important economic sectors that affect public 
health and safety.  Unsurprisingly, law is a constant presence in the U.S. health care system.  In 
other parts of this book, various health law issues are presented largely in terms of compliance 
with legal duties and obligations, as well as respect for the legal rights of others.  In everyday 
practice, most such issues have reasonably clear answers.  As long as physicians and health 
professionals are able to recognize the probability of legal considerations being relevant to a 
situation, some research and perhaps a brief consultation with a lawyer or compliance 
professional will generally reveal an advisable course of action. 
 
This chapter has gone beyond pursuing that limited albeit important objective. The more deeply 
students explore health law, the more they realize that “it’s complicated.” Experienced lawyers 
often answer questions with “it depends” for good reason. In many situations, sound legal 
judgment requires an ability to match subtle distinctions in fact to complex legal precedents. 
These problems may be magnified in health law, whose sources are particularly multifarious – 
constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and common law along with custom and practice – and 
whose subjects of regulation (physicians, nurses, hospitals, insurers, patients, families, 
pharmaceutical companies, etc.) interact with one another in complex patterns.  
 
For students of health system science, moreover, health law is key to understanding why the 
health care system operates as it does, and why it has been so challenging to improve. Legal 
standards, and the substantial financial subsidies that are based on them, can act as either barriers 
to, or facilitators of, health system change. Health law also has a profound relationship to 
medical ethics, a relationship derived from its grounding (for better or for worse) in the 
professional ethics of physicians, as well as its connection to the bioethics of adapting 
technological advances in biomedical science and informatics to the needs and concerns of 
patients and society. Considered from a broader vantage point, studying health law raises at least 
as many questions as it provides answers. The chapter embraces this duality across a number of 
legal domains from conflict of interest to end-of-life care.   
 
XI. Questions 
 
1. How much of a say should the medical profession have in what health laws are enacted?  
Should it depend on the subject matter of the law in question?  Should physicians help 
draft or enforce laws defining or protecting the quality of care?  Laws limiting who can 
practice medicine?  Laws determining what services health insurance must cover?  Laws 
establishing the methods of payment for those services?  Laws setting fees? 
 
2. Fair procedures are at the heart of legal governance.  For adjudicating a claim or charge, 
these consist of notice to the defendant, a structured opportunity to gather evidence and 
hear from witnesses, adversarial advocacy by legal counsel for each side, an impartial 
decision-maker, and a public, usually reasoned decision.  Legislation and administrative 
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regulation have similar features designed to promote transparency, public input and 
accountability, rationality, and even-handed enforcement.  In what ways are these 
procedures compatible or incompatible with medical professionalism? 
 
3. Which laws governing the system for financing health care in the United States would 
you change and why?  Would you expand public funding for health insurance for the 
poor, or direct public funding for health care services instead?  Would you alter the rules 
for how and how much physicians and hospitals are paid by Medicare and Medicaid?  
How would you revise health care financing to do a better job addressing health 
disparities and improving population health? 
 
4. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “When it comes to end of life 
decision-making, physicians defer too much to patients’ family members”? To what 
extent are family members good proxies for what patients would want? Are judges and 
courts well suited to mediate between family members and the patient care team?  Or 
should judicial processes be largely irrelevant to the daily operations of health care 
systems?  
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